Defendant next argues that the People improperly impeached Dr. Freedman. Defendant told Janus that he then drove Donnelly to Marshall Field's, his place of employment, but did not pay Donnelly the money. He was put to death in 1994. Several police officers and an assistant State's Attorney testified concerning defendant's confessions. He testified that the problem with psychoanalytic theory is that it requires an inference about mental processes which is not susceptible to proof. When defendant *36 did ask that the remainder of the voir dire be closed to the public, he did so only on the bare assertion that prospective jurors were not being fully candid. He stated that he had graves dug so that he would have graves available. 2d 913, 924-26, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2968-69, the Supreme Court rejected this argument with respect to similar wording in a Florida statute. That was part of the projective identification that I was explaining before." Defendant concludes that *24 "[w]ithout more specific information regarding time, a reasonable person could not have concluded that evidence of the alleged offense was presently on the premises to be searched." The People argue further, citing People v. Williams (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 115, and People v. Miller (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 439, that the instruction was properly refused because it did not contain a correct statement of law, as Illinois does not recognize a "mere personality disorder" as meeting the test for insanity. When asked his opinion as to whether he was legally sane under Illinois standards, the People objected and a side bar was had. Are you a coward? As we have already noted, since there never was a question concerning whether defendant actually committed the 33 murders, the instruction was unnecessary, and thus there was no reason for defense counsel to tender such an instruction. Our Rule 234 states that "[t]he court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors." The assistant State's Attorney stated: No objection was made to this, so the issue was waived on appeal. Dr. Rappaport testified that defendant would have brief psychotic episodes which would occur as a result of rage where "he thought these boys were him and he was the father" and the unmanageable rage he felt was actually against himself. Rignall's testimony during Gacy's trial helped to secure the latter's conviction and death sentence. Defendant placed the gag back in Donnelly's mouth, and started "playing around with" the object which was inserted in Donnelly's rectum. In the other instance cited by defendant, the prospective juror was excused for cause, so no error could have been committed in his questioning. Nor do we agree with defendant that it was not indicative that a crime had been committed but only "unusual" or "suspicious" when a 15-year-old boy stated that he was going to speak with the suspect, left his place of employment, and then failed to return. (476 F.2d 613, 614.) Defendant argues that because at the time he examined defendant, Dr. Heston was employed by the University of Iowa Medical School, he was receiving compensation since he examined defendant "as part of his job." Defendant admits that his argument on this point was rejected by this court in People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 146-47, and in People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 585-87. Nowout of print, used copies can go forhundreds of dollars online. Dr. Freedman explained that during the homosexual encounters with his victims, he projected his own anxieties about himself onto his victims, thinking that they, and not he, were "trash." That he confessed to 30 murders also supports the inference that he was aware that his conduct was criminal. Dr. Helen Morrison, a psychiatrist, diagnosed defendant as having a mixed psychosis or an atypical psychosis. The jury was also aware of the brutal nature of many of the murders and of the youth of many of the victims. He stated that defendant's antisocial personality helped him forget his criminal acts. Dr. Freedman testified that his diagnosis was consistent with a diagnosis of borderline personality and that the schizophrenic process was at the borderline and "breaks out in flowered symptomatology from time to time when the stress gets too high." Rather, the People assert, all of the People's experts stated that he was suffering "from a mere personality or character disorder.". The two Chicago newspapers carried many of these first two types of articles when the story first broke, but discontinued them a week to a month later. 2d 1326, 102 S. Ct. 2922, aff'd on remand (5th Cir.1982), 686 F.2d 311, vacated and remanded (1983), 463 U.S. 1223, 77 L. Ed. Jeff thought that man could kill somebody so he figured whatever he did to him, he was going to do it to other people, Wilder says in the docuseries. Moreover, we agree with defendant that the prejudicial nature of this information was compounded by reference to it in closing argument. HLN - Jeff Rignall wrote the book "29 Below" about | Facebook Also, the type of material contained in the headline would have a significant impact on the reader. Defendant contends next that the circuit court erred in permitting certain experts to testify that they had found defendant fit to stand trial. Defendant raises 14 issues concerning the presentation of his insanity defense to the jury. Now, Peacocks new docuseries, Alexa Danner, executive producer of the docuseries echoed that sentiment, telling, In December of 1978, following the disappearance of 15-year-old, Rignall and Wilder published 29 Below a book about the attack and the couples subsequent investigation into Gacys identity in 1979. jeffrey rignall testimony transcript - neerajshah.me 115-4(e).) In People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, the defendant advanced similar arguments, contending that a second jury would not have preconceived notions that the death penalty should be imposed. Defendant also complains that a second jury should have been impaneled for the death penalty hearing since the original jury allegedly confused the statutory mitigating factor of extreme emotional or mental disturbance with the issue of insanity. Defense counsel also stated: "Those psychiatrists will testify that he was unable to fully and consciously control his acts, which are motivated by overwhelming and uncontrollable primitive drives." He diagnosed defendant as having an antisocial personality. Defendant next contends that there were many instances where the People engaged in improper closing argument. Because the "splitting off" process and projection of a repressed part is an unconscious process, Dr. Brocher opined, "My diagnosis proves the psychotic process because only persons who are psychotic can split off so far that they negate reality." In light of defense counsel's able representation of defendant throughout the trial proceedings, we reject the contention, made by appellate counsel, that trial counsel "abandoned [defendant] and rendered ineffective assistance of counsel * * *.". Michael Rossi also worked for defendant. jeffrey rignall testimony transcript - alihsaan.org After stating his diagnosis, Dr. Freedman explained how he reached his conclusions. The question raised could serve only to divert the jury's attention from the issues in the case (People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 539), and the court correctly instructed the jury to disregard the testimony and the comments. Ill. Rev. Defendant argues that the murder of Timothy O'Rourke was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and that this erroneous conviction necessitates a remand for a new sentencing hearing. Ried stated that, at the time of the incident with the hammer, he had not looked at defendant before defendant struck him. Defendant brought Donnelly into his home, into a room which had a bar, and told Donnelly that "he was an important person" and that "still he didn't get the respect he deserved * * *."